UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-29-2017

Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45306

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs

Recommended Citation
"Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Appellant's Brief Dckt. 45306" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records &
Briefs, All. 7192.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7192

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO

MICHAEL JOHNSON,
DOCKET NO.: 45306

Plaintiff/Appellant,

(Ada County Docket No. CV-PI-201613887)

vs.
WAL-MART STORES, INC., a Delaware
corporation, doing business as Wal-Mart Super
Center and Wal-Mart; WAL-MART
ASSOCIATES, INC., a Delaware corporation;
and WAL-MART STORE NO. 2508.
Defendants/Respondents.

ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT
OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
HONORABLE, JASON D. SCOTT, DISTRICT JUDGE PRESIDING
****
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF

Eric B. Swartz, ISB#6396
JONES & SWARTZ PLLC
623 West Hays Street
Boise, Idaho 83702

Stephen R. Thomas, ISB#2326
Tyler J. Anderson, ISB#6632
Mindy M. Muller ISB#7983
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HAWLEY, LLP
877 West Main Street, Suite 1000
Boise, Idaho 83702

Attorney for Appellant

Attorneys for Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................ 1
A.

Nature of the Case................................................................................................. 1

B.

Course of Proceedings .......................................................................................... 1

C.

Statement of Facts ................................................................................................. 2

II.

ISSUE ON APPEAL ....................................................................................................... 10

III.

ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... 10
The Trial Court Erred as Matter of Law by Granting Summary Judgment
to the Respondents .......................................................................................................... 10

IV.

A.

Standard of Review ............................................................................................. 10

B.

Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist on Respondent’s Business
Practices Creating a Recurring or Continuous Condition that Gives
Rise to a Foreseeable Risk of Harm .................................................................. 11

C.

Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exists on Respondent’s Failure to
Keep the Premises in a Reasonably Safe Condition and Warn of the
Dangerous Spill Condition ................................................................................. 18

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 21

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................................................... 1
A.

Nature of the Case ................................................................................................. 1

B.

Course of Proceedings ........................................................................................... 1

C.

Statement of Facts ..................................................................................................... 2

II.

ISSUE ON APPEAL ............................................................................................................ 10

III.

ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................... 10
The Trial Court Erred as Matter of Law by Granting Summary Judgment
to the Respondents ........................................................................................................... 10

IV.

A.

Standard of Review ............................................................................................. 10

B.

Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist on Respondent's Business
Practices Creating a Recurring or Continuous Condition that Gives
Rise to a Foreseeable Risk of Harm ................................................................... 11

C.

Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exists on Respondent's Failure to
Keep the Premises in a Reasonably Safe Condition and Warn of the
Dangerous Spill Condition .................................................................................. 19

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

All v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp.,
109 Idaho 479,482, 708 P.2d 884,887 (1985) ..................................................................... 16, 17
Ball v. City ofBlacifoot,
152 Idaho 673, 677-78, 273 P.3d 1266, 1270-71 (2012) ............................................................. 16
Blickenstaff v. Clegg,
140 Idaho 572, 97 P.3d 439 (2004) ............................................................................................. 11
Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue,
148 Idaho 391 (2008) ......................................... .......................................................................... 10
Harrison v. Taylor,
115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989) ......................................................................................... 19
Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart Inc.,
134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct. App. 2000) ................................................. 10, 11, 12
Loomis v. City ofHailey,
119 Idaho 434,436, 807P.2d 1272, 1274 (1991) ........... .... ............... .......... ... ... ......................... .11
Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
95 Idaho 732,518 P.2d 1194 (1974) ........................................................................................... 16
Renzo v. Idaho State Dep 't. ofAgric.,
149 Idaho 777,779,241 P.3d 950,952 (2010) ........................................................................... 11
Rife v. Long,
127 Idaho 841,849,908 P.2d 143, 151 (1995) ..... ...................................................................... 11
Shea v. Kevic Corp.,
156 Idaho 540, 545, 328 P.3d 520, 525 (2014) ............................................................... 11, 16, 18
Stem v. Prouty,
152 Idaho 590,594,272 P.3d 562, 566 (2012) ........................................................................... 19
Tommerup v. Albertson's Inc.,
101 Idaho 1, 3,607 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1980) ............................................................................... 19

11

I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

This is a premises liability action based on claims of negligent failure to warn of recurring
and continuous dangerous conditions on the premises and failure to exercise ordinary care to
maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.

B.

Course of Proceedings

On August 1, 2016, Appellant, Michael Johnson, filed his complaint in the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Ada County, Idaho, seeking recovery for injuries to his right knee as a result of
slipping on a spill at Wal-Mart Store 2508 located at 8300 West Overland Road, Boise, Idaho. In his
complaint, Appellant brought claims for negligence and premises liability. 1 On August 23, 2016,
Respondents filed their answer. 2
On May 10, 2017, Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment. 3 Respondents argued,

inter alia, that Appellant could not prove premises liability on the theory of method of business or
recurring or continuous hazard, and that Respondents were not negligent for failing to warn of, or
remedy, the isolated incident at the particular location and on the particular day that Appellant
slipped and fell because there were no prior incidents at that exact location and because there is no
evidence of how long the spill was present before Appellant encountered it. 4
On May 25, 2017, Appellant filed an opposition to Respondents' motion for summary

R. 000006-10.
R. 000011-18.
3
R. 000019-35.
4
R. 000019-35.
I

2
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judgment. 5 Appellant presented evidence that, inter alia, Respondents were engaged in a method of
business that they knew created a recurring or continuous spill and slip hazard; that they knew such
method of business created a foreseeable risk of harm; and that they failed to warn customers, like
Appellant, about such risk. 6
On May 31, 2017, Respondents filed its reply brief. 7 Respondents argued, inter alia, that a
dangerous business practice was not established merely because customers can carry liquids around
the store. 8 Respondents also argued that a mere possibility of a spill is not sufficient for liability but that it must be shown that Respondents knew of a greater than usual likelihood of a spill in a
particular area. 9
On June 7, 2017, a hearing was held on the Respondents' motion. 10 By order dated June 22,
2017, the Trial Court granted Respondents' motion for summary judgment. 11 The Trial Court issued
a judgment on July 3, 2017, dismissing all of Appellant's claims with prejudice. 12 Mr. Johnson filed
his Notice of Appeal on August 2, 2017. 13

C.

Statement of Facts

a.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart Corporate") owns and operates Respondent Wal-

Mart Store 2508, in Boise, Idaho. 14

5

R. 000084-99.
R. 000084-99.
7
R. 000175-186.
8
R. 000180-182.
9
R. 000180-182.
10
Tr. (6/7/2017), 4-27.
II R. 000187-193.
12
R. 000194-195.
13
R. 000196-199.
14
R. 000113 (Wal-Mart Rule 30(b)(6), pp. 16:18 - 17:15).
6
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b.

For about four years leading upto June, 2015, and the day that Appellant slipped on a

spill at Respondent's Wal-Mart Store 25 08, Respondent knew that spills were a big problem at Store
2508. In June, 2011, Respondent issued an internal warning to alert its employees about the spill
problem:

• Spills are largely responsible for slip/trip/fall accidents in the
store. Slip/trip/fall accidents are included in the Big 3 accident
focus and require additional focus to reduce these accident
claims.
(R. 000166; see also, R.000115 (February 28, 2017, Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Wal-Mart
Defendants ("Wal-Mart 30(b)( 6)"), p. 25 :9-11, designee testifying internal policy about spills being
largely responsible for slip/trip/fall accident was to educate employee about the hazard: "Q. [The
internal policy is to] [e]ducate] [employees] about the hazards of the spills on the premises? A.
Yes.").
c.

By June, 2015, which is four years after the internal warning was first issued, spills

remained a problem at Respondent's Store 2508:
Q.

d.

A.

So the second page in 114, the first bullet point there says
spills are largely responsible for slip, trip and fall accidents in
the store. Do you see that there?
Yes.

Q.
A.

As of June of2015 was that statement true for Store 2508?
Yes. 15

Despite Respondent's knowledge of the spill hazard, and knowing it needed to warn

its employees about it, Respondent is not aware of ever having warned customers about the hazard:

15

R. 000127 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 75:10-17).
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Q.

Did Wal-Mart, in June of 2015, did Wal-Mart do anything to
alert customers to that fact?
I'm not sure.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
e.

Is there a sign that says warning, customers, spills are largely
responsible for slip, trip, fall accidents in this store?
I'm not sure. I don't -- I'm not sure.
If you don't know, is there anyone a[t] Store 2508, your store,
who would know about such a warning being posted?
Yeah, I haven't seen a warning posted. 16

Knowing that spills were largely responsible for slip, trip, and fall accidents

throughout the entire Store 2508, Respondent created employment positions whose sole job it was to
walk the store's action alley:
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

What are the high traffic hours?
Eleven to eight.

Q.
A.

Eleven a.m. to eight p.m.?
Correct.

Q.

How many -- and their sole job is to cruise aisles and look for
spills?
They cruise -- they go around the racetrack or action alley. 17

A.
f.

Does Wal-Mart have a position where their sole job is to
cruise the aisles all day looking for spills?
We have a strategic team that works on the floors during the
high traffic hours.

The action alley circles different sections of the store. Respondent's 30(b)(6) witness

identified the action alley with yellow highlighting on the map of Store 2508 :

16
17

R. 000127-128 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 75:18 - 76:5).
R. 000117 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 33:3-15).
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fBtHHl?SfK@HilNNlf S

(R. 000147 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), Ex. 2); R. 117-118 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 33:3 -37:10, designee
identifying location of action alley throughout store 2508).
f.

Knowing that spills were largely responsible for slip, trip, and fall accidents at Store

2508, and throughout the entire store, Respondent also requires its employee to be continuously
looking out for spills in their areas when they are on the store floor:
A.

. .. while the associates are out on the floor doing whatever
they're doing, they're supposed to be looking for, you know,
things on the floor or spills while they are out there on the
floor. It is not a by hour thing. It is while they are out there,
they are supposed to be looking and making sure there is
nothing on the floor or, you know, doesn't have to be on the
floor. It could be, you know, something else that they find
where they're going -- that they're making sure that -- trying to
make sure that the area is safe for the customer.
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Q.
A.

All the time?
Yeah. I mean, it could be in the back room. Making sure it is
safe in the back room. It could be on the floor. While they're
in the building, they are supposed to be making sure their
immediate area they are in is safe for the customer.

Q.

What does Wal-Mart do to make sure that every square inch
of Store 2508 is getting an associate's eyes on it to make sure
that it is safe?
It's just -- it's part of the culture. I don't know how else to
explain it. It is, you know, they're taught it. There is
computer-based learning that that we go through that talks
about it. There is policies that they can review or reviewed
with them. And then there's just the layers of people in the
building that help make sure it happens.

A.

Q.

A.
g.

Is there a method or a policy or something that Wal-Mart has
to make sure that every aisle is getting a safety sweep at least
every certain number of minutes?
No, it's -- no. 18

On June 30, 2015, Appellant was a guest of Respondent's Store 2508. Appellant was

looking for motorcycle tie-down straps, and was directed by a store employee to go down the
housewares aisle in the direction of the aisle containing the straps. 19 As Appellant neared the end of
the housewares aisle, he slipped in a liquid. 20
h.

The end of the housewares aisle where Appellant encountered the spill was

immediately adjacent to the action alley.

Respondent's store manager and 30(b)(6) witness

identified the action alley with yellow highlighting and the location of the spill encountered by
Appellant with a red circle:

18

R. 000116-117 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 30:24 - 32:9).
R. 000042-43; 47-48; and 52-54 (Deposition of Michael Johnson, pp. 95:16 -96:13 (describing
incident); 102:17 - 103:7 (describing incident); 112:15 - 114:23 (confirming June 30, 2015, incident
statement and incident date).
20
R. 000042-43; 47-48; and 52-54 (Deposition of Michael Johnson, pp. 95:16 - 96:13 (describing
19
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u.
R. 147 (Ex. 2 to 30(b)(6)
Depo); R. 117-118 (pp.
33:3 - 37:10, designee
identifying location of
action alley immediately
adjacent to housewares
alle with hi hli hter
1.

R. 80 (Declaration of
Jason Walker, ,-i 12 and
Ex. A thereto, showing
location of slip with red
circle)

Another of Respondent's employees was immediately across from where Appellant

encountered the spill. 21 The employee was by the front cone of the bike rack immediately across the
action alley that Appellant slipped into. 22

J.

At no time during his visit to Respondent's Store 2508 was Appellant warned of the

risks of spills on the premises. 23
k.

At no time during Appellant's visit to Respondent's Store 2508 did Appellant see any

incident); 102:17 - 103:7 (describing incident); 112:15 - 114:23 (confirming June 30, 2015, incident
statement and incident date)).
21
R. 000047-48 (Deposition of Michael Johnson, pp. 102:17 - 103:7 (describing incident and
employee standing near spill).
22
R. 000157 (Respondent employee incident statement); R. 000125 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 66:1267:22 (30(b)(6) witness identifying the employee witness standing by bike rack and bike rack being
across from the housewares aisle).
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signs warning of the risks of spills on the premises. 24

1.

Respondent's internal warning to employees that spills are throughout the store, and

not just isolated to aisles where fluids are stored for sale, is reasonable, because liquids are permitted
to come into and move around all over Respondent's store without any restriction:
Q.

A.

At the time of Mr. Johnson's fall, did Wal-Mart prohibit
customers from bringing liquids in to Store 2508?
No.

A.

So customers could bring in liquids of any type when they
came in to shop?
Yes.

Q.
A.

Was there any restrictions on what the liquid was carried in?
No.

Q.
A.

Could it be a water bottle like you've got there with a little
screw top on it, right?
Yes.

Q.
A.

It could be an open mug like your coffee mug there?
Yes. 25

Q.

***
Q.

A.

Did the greeter check to make sure that customers bringing
liquids in to the store were in containers that wouldn't spill?
Not that I'm aware of. 26

***
Q.

BY MR. SWARTZ: You could determine how and when
beverages leave the restaurant portion of your store, right?

23

R. 000100-101.
R. 000100-101.
25
R. 000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 21 :11 - 22:1).
26
R. 000128 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 79:5-8).
24
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MS. MULLER: Referring to McDonalds?
MR. SWARTZ: Yes.
THE WITNESS:
McDonald's.

The space the McDonalds owns is leased to

Q.
A.

BYMR. SWARTZ: Yes.
So McDonalds is McDonalds. They are just leasing the space
from our store.

Q.

Sure. And you can stand at the line between the leased space
and your store and you could tell customers, I'm sorry, but you
cannot bring your beverage in to my store without having a
fixed lid on it, right?
No, I mean I would have to get approval to do that through
Wal-Mart Corporate home office.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.

Have you ever asked about trying to put some restrictions on
beverages being carried around your store?
I personally have not asked.
Have you ever asked about putting some restrictions on what
customers can bring in to the store as far as liquids go?
Not to my knowledge.
Knowing that spills are largely responsible for slip, trip and
fall accidents in Store 2508, would you agree with me that it
would be a reasonable thing for you to do in restricting how
customers can carry beverages around your store?

MS. MULLER: Objection. Form. Go ahead.
THE WITNESS: I have to adhere to the policies and procedures that
are laid out by Wal-Mart Stores, Incorporated.
Q.

A.

27

BY MR. SWARTZ: And they don't have a policy or
procedure for assisting customers with making sure that
they're carrying their liquids appropriately?
Not to my knowledge. 27

R. 000129 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 80:4 - 81:19).
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***
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

At the time of Mr. Johnson's fall at Store 2508, did Wal-Mart
Store 2508 sell products that were liquid based?
Yes.
Did Wal-Mart, at the time of the fall, did Wal-Mart direct,
prohibit, restrict in any way how a customer could move
liquids within Store 2508?
No. 28

II.
ISSUE ON APPEAL

Did the trial court err by granting summary judgment to the Respondents?

III.
ARGUMENT
The Trial Court Erred as Matter of Law by Granting Summary Judgment to the
Respondents
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews an appeal from an order of summary judgment de novo, and it applies the
same standards used by the trial court. 29 A grant of summary judgment is warranted where it is
shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw." 30
When the party moving for summary judgment will not carry the burden of production or
proof at trial, the genuine issue of material fact burden may be carried by establishing the absence of
evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. 31 Such an

28

R. 000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 22:2-10).
Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,394,224 P.3rd, 458,461 (2008).
30
I.R.C.P. 56(c).
31
Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct. App. 2000).

29
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absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's
own evidence, or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that such
proof of an element is lacking. 32 Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden
then shifts to the party opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, discovery responses or
affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial, or to offer a valid justification for the failure
to do so under I.R.C.P. 56(f). 33 "The burden of proving the absence of an issue of material fact rests
at all times upon the moving party."34
A material fact is one upon which the outcome of the case may be different. 35
"Circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact. ... However, the non-moving
party may not rest on a mere scintilla of evidence."36 If the evidence is conflicting on material
issues, or if reasonable minds could reach different conclusions, summary judgment is not
appropriate. 37 The facts must be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. 38 All
reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. 39
B.

GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST ON RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS
PRACTICES CREATING A RECURRING OR CONTINUOUS CONDITION THAT GIVES
RISE TO A FORESEEABLE RISK OF HARM

The Trial Court missed or ignored and/or failed to draw reasonable inferences from the
evidence showing Respondent's recurring or continuous spill problem that it failed to warn of, and
failed to correct. Appellant's slip and fall on that particular day, particular spot, and particular way,

32

Heath, 134 Idaho at 712, 8 P.3d at 1255.
Heath, 134 Idaho at 712, 8 P.3d at 1255.
34
Blickenstaff v. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 577, 97 P.3d 439,444 (2004) (emphasis added).
35
Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 849, 908 P.2d 143, 151 (1995).
36
Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540,545,328 P.3d 520, 525 (2014).
37
Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,436, 807P.2d 1272, 1274 (1991).
38
Renzo v. Idaho State Dep't. ofAgric., 149 Idaho 777,779,241 P.3d 950,952 (2010).
33

APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 11

may have been an isolated incident, but Respondent's continuous and recurring spill problem
throughout the entire store is not isolated. Evidence shows that Respondent's business practices give
rise to the foreseeable risk of a spill and resulting harm in all sections of its store. Even more
significant is evidence that shows Respondent's business practices give rise to the foreseeable risk of
a spill and resulting harm in the aisle immediately adjacent to the spill where Appellant slipped.
The Trial Court missed or ignored this evidence and/or failed to draw reasonable inference in
Appellant's favor, and, in so doing, erred in refusing to apply the recurring or continuous hazard
theory in this case. The Trial Court held it "won't impute knowledge to Walmart simply because it
lets customers carry beverages about the store. That is a commonplace business practice."40 The
Trial Court also concluded that while spills "might be a fact of life, spills on the trash-can aisle
... aren't, or at least hadn't been before Johnson's accident" and on that basis concluded that
Appellant's slip and fall was an isolated incident. 41
In so doing, the Trial Court was hyper-focused on Respondent's testimony that it was
unaware of a spill occurring in the houseware aisle before June 30, 2015, and the absence of any
evidence of a liquid being stored in that aisle. 42 That led the Trial Court to then conclude that
evidence of Respondent allowing customers to carry beverages about the store was not enough to
impute knowledge of the particular spill, at the particular spot, and at the particular time of
Appellant's slip on the spill. 43
But, the Trial Court missed or ignored and/or failed to draw reasonable inferences from the

39

Heath, 134 Idaho at 712, 8 P.3d at 1255.
R. 000191.
41
R. 000191.
42
R. 000190-191.
43
R. 000191.
40
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evidence that for about four years before the spill encountered by Appellant, Respondent's store
operations resulted in spills being largely responsible for slip, trip and fall accidents in the store.
Respondent alerted its employees to this fact in June, 2011, as part ofits internal policies. The spills
were a big enough problem that Respondent alerted the employees about the spills on the premises to
educate the employees about the hazardous condition:

• Spills are largely responsible for slip/trip/fall accidents in the
store. Slip/trip/fall accidents are included in the Big 3 accident
focus and require additional focus to reduce these accident
claims.
(R. 000166; see also R. 000115 (February 28, 2017, Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Wal-Mart
Defendants ("Wal-Mart 30(b)(6)"), p. 25 :9-11, designee testifying internal policy about spills being
largely responsible for slip/trip/fall accidents was to educate employee about the hazard: "Q. [The
internal policy is to] [e]ducate] [employees] about the hazards of the spills on the premises? A.
Yes.").
By June, 2015, Respondent was still warning its employees about spills largely being
responsible for accidents in the store. 44 Respondent admits that by June, 2015, about four years after
issuing the internal warning, spills were still largely responsible for slips/trips/falls in Store 2508. 45
In light of the internal warning being issued and staying in effect for about four years, it is reasonable
to infer that spills are not isolated incidents at Respondent's Store 2508. The Trial Court failed to
draw this reasonable inference.

44
45

R. 000127 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 75:10-17).
R. 000127 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 75:10-17).
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Also, Respondent's warning to its employees is not limited to a particular section of the store,
such as the produce aisle, the beverage aisles, or other liquid products aisles. Respondent, instead,
warns of spills "in the store" - as in the whole store. 46
Respondent's warning to its employees also does not identify a particular source of spills,
such as leaking products. Respondent, instead, warns of "spills" - as in all types of spills. 47
Respondent's store-wide warning to its employees makes sense. Respondent's operations
create an environment where liquids in the store are not limited to a particular type, nor are they
restricted to a particular section in the store. Liquids in the store may be for sale, or may be brought
into the store by customers, or may be purchased in the store and consumed in the store by
customers. 48 Further, no liquid - whether for sale, or not - is restricted to a particular part of the
store. There are no restrictions on how liquids may be carried or transported around the store. 49
Even if Respondent did not know that a spill of any type can end up in any part of its store, it
certainly knew that there was a greater than usual likelihood of a spill occurring immediately
adjacent to the spill that Appellant encountered. Respondent has employees whose sole job it is to
look for spills in the action alley. 50 The spill that Appellant encountered is where the action alley and
housewares alley meet. Respondent's store manager and 30(b)(6) witness identified the action alley
with yellow highlighting and the location of the spill encountered by Appellant with a red circle:

46

R. 000166.
R. 000166.
48
R. 000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 21:11 - 22:1); R. 000128 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 79:5-8);
R. 000128-129 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 78:15 - 81 :19); R. 000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 22:2-10).
49
R. 000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 21 :11 - 22:1); R. 000128 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 79:5-8);
R. 000128-129 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 78: 15 - 81 :19); R. 000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 22:2-10).
50
R. 000117 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 33:3-15).
47
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u.
(R. 147 (Ex. 2 to 30(b)(6)
Depo); R. 117-118 (pp. 33:3
-37:10, designee identifying
location of action alley
immediately adjacent to
housewares
alley
with
highlighter); R. 147 (Ex. 2 to
30 b 6 De osition

(R. 80 (Declaration of Jason
Walker, ,12 and Ex. A
thereto, showing location of
slip with red circle)

If, as here, spills in the action alley were so foreseeable to Respondent that it created

employment positions specifically to walk the action alley looking for spills, it is reasonable to infer
that spills immediately adjacent to the action alley are also foreseeable. The Trial Court's conclusion
that spills are only foreseeable in areas where liquids are being stored is inconsistent with
Respondent's business practices - as evidenced by Respondent hiring employees whose sole job it is
to walk the action alley that circles the entire store, is not exclusive to aisles with liquid products,
and which runs immediately adjacent to the spill encountered by Appellant. Respondent obviously
foresaw that spills can happen anywhere in its store.
Respondent does not just expect spills where liquids are stored for sale or in the action alley,
either. It has its employees looking for spills throughout the entire building- they are supposed to be
looking for spills wherever they are: "While [employees are] in the building, they are supposed to be
making sure their immediate area they are in is safe for the customer. 51

51

R. 000116-117 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 31 :14-17).
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Respondent's foresight about spills taking place anywhere in its store is reasonable in light of
its business practices and its long history of recurring or continuous spill problem. Respondent
allows customers to come into the store with beverages of their choice and in containers of their
choice. 52 Respondent has an in-store McDonald's restaurant, and allows McDonald's customers to
leave the restaurant with drinks. 53 Respondent also sells a large number of liquids in its store. 54
There are no restrictions on how liquids can move throughout the store. 55 This business practice is
not isolated. It is recurring and continuous - so much so that Respondent continuously looks for
spills throughout its whole store, including the location of the spill that Appellant encountered.
The evidence demonstrates that Respondent knew, or, by exercise of reason should have
known, that its operating methods created a "continuous or easily foreseeably" dangerous spill
condition, and that is a sufficient basis for liability under Idaho law. See All v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp.,
109 Idaho 479, 482, 708 P.2d 884, 887 (1985) (evidence of pot holes, in general, rather than a
specific pot hole in a specific location, was sufficient evidence to justify submitting the case to a
jury). See also, Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540, 549-51, 328 P.3d 520, 529-31 (2014) (liability
may exist if the landowner or possessor has a habit of creating a foreseeably unsafe condition or
allows an unsafe condition to develop or exist over a period of time.); Ball v. City ofBlaclfoot, 152
Idaho 673, 677-78, 273 P.3d 1266, 1270-71 (2012) (liability through showing of premises
maintenance habit); and Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732,518 P.2d 1194 (1974) (liability
where dangerous condition existed over a period of time). There are genuine issue of material fact

52

R.
R.
54
R.
55
R.
53

000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 21:11 - 22:1).
000128-129 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 79:9 - 81:19).
000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 22:2-5).
000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 22:2-10).
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about Respondent's spill-prone business operations that only a jury can answer. Summary judgment
in Respondent's favor was granted in error.
As the All v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., case makes clear, evidence of generally recurring or
continuously hazardous conditions is sufficient evidence to present to a jury. In All, the Plaintiff
presented evidence of the general condition of a proprietor's parking lot forming pot holes over a
period of time. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the Plaintiffs evidence of the general condition
was sufficient, and that the Plaintiff need not show evidence of the proprietor's knowledge of the
specific pot hole in which Plaintiff fell:
In the instant case, Mrs. All presented sufficient evidence to establish
that the dangerous condition of the parking lot was a continuous and
foreseeable consequence of Shelby's and Smith's operating methods.
The formation of the specific hole into which Mrs. All fell was not an
isolated incident. Therefore, it was unnecessary for Mrs. All to show
that Shelby's and Smith's had actual or constructive knowledge of the
specific pothole involved. It was enough to show that they were aware
of the continuous formation of potholes in the parking lot through the
winter and spring of 1982.

All v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., l 09 Idaho 4 79, 482, 708 P .2d 884, 887 (1985). As with the pot holes in
All, spills at Store 2508 are not isolated incidents. They were a big enough problem throughout the
whole store that Respondent warned its own employees about spills for about four years before the
spill encountered by Appellant. Spills in the action alley immediately next to where Appellant
encountered the spill were a big enough problem that Respondent created positions whose sole job it
was to look for spills there. And, the action alley and the location where Appellant encountered the
spill are not separated by a bright line or barrier, but merge into one another.
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.

...

(R. 147 (Ex. 2 to 30(b)(6) Depo); R.
117-118 (pp. 33:3-37:10, designee
identifying location of action alley
immediately adjacent to housewares
alley with highlighter); R. 147 (Ex.
2 to 30 b 6 De osition)

n.
(R. 80 (Declaration of Jason
Walker, if12 and Ex. A thereto,
showing location of slip with
red circle)

Given the lack of separation between the action alley and the exit of the housewares aisle
where Appellant encountered the spill, this case is also analogous to Shea v. Kevic Corporation, 156
Idaho 540, 328 P.3d 520(2014). The Plaintiff in Shea presented evidence of a recurring dangerous
condition of ice build-up, generally, at the exit of a car wash, but not at the specific location of her
slip within the general exit area. The Idaho Supreme Court held such evidence was sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact:
Although Shea has not shown that Kevic had actual knowledge of the
specific ice buildup in front of Shea's car, and that it had existed for a
sufficient time to allow warning or correction, this Court concludes
that Shea has offered more than a scintilla of evidence to prove that
Kevic had actual or constructive notice of operating methods that
could cause a dangerous condition of ice buildup when and where
Shea fell.
Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540,550,328 P.3d 520, 530 (2014).
The reasonable inference to be drawn in Appellant's favor here is that spills were, or should
have been, reasonably foreseeable in the general area of the action alley just as much as they were in
the action alley. This is particularly true where, as here, the spill at the housewares aisle exit merges
into the action alley without any physical separation and are, effectively, one-in-the-same general
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area.
C.

GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS ON RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO
KEEP THE PREMISES IN A REASONABLY SAFE CONDITION AND WARN OF THE
DANGEROUS SPILL CONDITION

As a landowner or possessor of land, Respondent owed its customers, including the
Appellant, a duty: (a) "to keep the premises reasonably safe" and (b) "to warn of any concealed
dangers which the landowner knows of or should have known of upon reasonable investigation of
the land." Stem v. Prouty, 152 Idaho 590,594,272 P.3d 562, 566 (2012). The duty to warn of a
dangerous condition is premised upon the proprietor's "superior knowledge" of the perilous
instrumentality and the danger therefrom to persons going upon the property. Tommerup v.

Albertson's Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 3, 607 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1980), overruled on other grounds by
Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989). In this case, Respondent did not warn of
the spill danger its business practices created and which Respondent was aware of for about four
years before the day Appellant encountered a spill, and Respondent did not keep the premises in a
reasonably safe condition.
Respondent's knowledge of the recurring and dangerous spill condition at its Store 2508 is
obvious. Spills were such a serious recurring and continuous hazard at Store 2508 that Respondent
warned its employees about it, and it did so for about four years leading up to the day that Appellant
slipped in Respondent's store. It is undisputed that the Appellant was not warned. 56 And,
Respondent presented no evidence that it warned its customers about the recurring and continuous
spill condition. Instead, Respondent states that it was not aware of any warning given to its
customers about the recurring and continuous spill condition:

56

R. 000100-101.
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Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Did Wal-Mart, in June of 2015, did Wal-Mart do anything to
alert customers to that fact [- that spills are largely responsible
for slip, trip and fall accidents in the store]?
I'm not sure.
Is there a sign that says warning, customers, spills are largely
responsible for slip, trip, fall accidents in this store?
I'm not sure. I don't -- I'm not sure.
If you don't know, is there anyone a[t] Store 2508, your store,
who would know about such a warning being posted?
Yeah, I haven't seen a warning posted. 57

As the moving party, Respondent has the burden of showing an absence of genuine issue of
material fact on this point, and it failed to do so. Summary judgment in Respondent's favor was
inappropriate.
A genuine issue of material fact also exists as to whether Respondent kept its premises in a
reasonably safe condition. If, despite its efforts to address the recurring and continuous spill hazard,
the spill hazard existed for about four years, it is reasonable to infer that Respondent is not keeping
its premises in a reasonably safe condition. It is not even entirely clear that Respondent performed
the measures it had in place to keep the premises safe on the day Appellant encountered a spill. At
least two employees were in the area of the spill that Appellant encountered. One employee directed
Appellant down the aisle where Appellant slipped in the spill. 58 Another employee was across the
action alley and at the bike cone immediately across from the spill that Appellant encountered. 59
The facts are undisputed that Appellant left one employee who directed Appellant to walk

57

R. 000127-128 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 75:18 - 76:5).
R. 000042-43; 47-48; and 52-54 (Deposition of Michael Johnson, pp. 95:16 - 96:13 (describing
incident); pp. 102:17 - 103:7 (describing incident)).
59
R. 00004 7-48 (Deposition of Michael Johnson, 102: 17 - 103 :7 (describing incident and employee
standing near spill); R. 000157 (Respondent employee incident statement); R. 000125 (Wal-Mart
30(b)(6), pp. 66:12 - 67:22 (30(b)(6) witness identifying the front bike rack cone across from spill)).
58
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down the housewares aisle, only to slip and fall just feet away from another employee immediately
across the aisle from where the spill was located. And, in between the two employees was the action
alley where other employees were supposed to be looking for spills. If, as Respondent testifies, its
employees are supposed to be looking around their immediate area to make sure it is safe for
customers, it is reasonable to infer that Respondent's employees did not perform their duties on the
day Appellant encountered the spill. Given these facts and the reasonable inferences that must be
drawn from them, it was inappropriate for the Trial Court to grant summary judgment in
Respondent's favor.
IV.
CONCLUSION

The Trial Court missed or ignored evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact
preventing summary judgment in Respondent's favor. Drawing all reasonable inferences in a light
most favorable to Appellant, a jury must decide whether Respondent knew or should have known
about the continuous or recurring spill hazard at Respondent's Store 2508. Drawing all reasonable
inferences in a light most favorable to Appellant, a jury must decide whether Respondent warned of
the continuous and recurring spill hazard at Respondent's Store 2508 and whether Respondent
maintained the area where Appellant encountered the spill in a reasonably safe manner.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of December, 2017.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of December, 2019, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was served on the following individual(s) by the method indicated:

Stephen R. Thomas, ISB#2326
Tyler J. Anderson, ISB#6632
Mindy M. Muller ISB#7983
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS &
HAWLEY,LLP
877 West Main Street, Suite 1000
Boise, Idaho 83 702
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